Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Norman H. Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company
of Utah : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Mark S. Miner; Wendell R. Jones; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Jordan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Utah, No. 7347 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1125

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7347
Case N·o. 7347

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN H. JiO·RDAN,
PlaiJntiff and Respondent,

vs.

c.o·CA-DOLA B·OTTLIN1G OOMPANY

~7
.ll

o~F

UTAH, a corporation,
Defendant arnd Appellant.

1f
L:
Jl
AUG :

~

~ ~K s. MINER,
j~~··! ~NDELL
R.
_.

19t.--9

JONES

4ttorneys for Plaintiff
and Resp·ondent

~--------------------~-----------

CLERK, SUPREME COURT,UTAH

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page·
STA!~EMENT OF F.ACTS .......................................................................................... !

CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ....................................................................

7

ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................................

8

POINT I. THE EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING THAT
THE DEFENDANT, COCA-COLA COMPANY, BOTTLED THE POISONOUS BOTTLE FROM WHICH
THE PLAINTIFF DRANK .............. ~ ............................. :...................

8

POINT II.

THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED :MORE THAN
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE
AXD WAS PROPERLY GRANTED A VERDICT BY
THE JURY ..............................................................................................
A~IPLE

9

POINT III.

THE PLAINTIFF PRESENTED MORE THAN
EVIDENCE FOR RECOVERY UNDER THE
BREACH OF WARRANTY THEORY ........................................ 19
A~:f.PLE

POINT IV. THE SCOPE OF CROSS EXAMINATION IS
NOT LIMITED WHEN DIRECTED AT THE CREDIJULITY, BIAS OR INTEREST OF A WITNESS ....................... 28
CASES CITED
Anderson v. Tyler, 274 N.W. 48 ............................................................................. 22
Auzenne v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 ......... ........ ...... ......................... 17
Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23; 177 S.W. 80 ................ 24
Gatani v. Swift & Co., 251 P. 52, 95 Alt. 931 ............................................ 21, 26
Chapman v. Jackson Coca-Cola Co., 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 .................... 14
Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Evansville v. WHliam.s, 27 N. E. (2nd)
702 .................................................................................................................. 12, 17
Cook v. Peoples Milk Co., 152 N.Y.S. 465 ............................... .12, 13, 15, 16, 17
Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 ........ 18, 21, 24
Dothan-Chero~ca Cola Bottling Co. v. Weeks, 16 Ala. app. 639,
80 So. 734 ............................................................................................................. 21
Dow Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 13 N.E. (2nd) 130 ............................ 23
Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 77 P. (2nd) 835 ........ ~ ........................... 16
;Fissure M.in. Co. v. Ole Susan Min. Co., 220438, 63 P. 587 ..................... ....... 29
-Flessher v. Corsters Packing Co., 93 Wash. 48, 160 P. 14 ............................ 21
Goldman and Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Alt. 866
14
Haley v. Swift & Co. (152 Wis. 570) 140 N.W. 292 -. ....................................... 26
Hertzler v. 1\fanshum, 228 Mich. 416; 200 N.W. 155 ................................ 21, 23
·Hollis v. Ouacheta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 196 So. 376 ........................ 17
Holt v. Nelson, 109 Pac. 470, 379 Utah 566 .................................................... 29
Kelley v. Ouachita Dairy, 715 So. 199 ................................................................. 17
Kelterer v. Armour & Co., D. C. 200 F. 322 ........................................................ 26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(INDEX (Continued)

Page
Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P. (2nd) 799 (1939) ................................ 27
Link·er vs. Quaker Oats, 1 Fed. Supp. 794 ........................................................ 17
Manaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. 76, 189A,, 714 ................ 26
McCowan v. Northeast Siberian Co., 41 Wash. 675, 84 p. 614 .................... 29
Mazetti v. Armour Co., 75 Wash. 135 p. 633 ............................................ 21, 25
Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104 119 N.W.
428, 131 Am. St. Rep. 44 ............................................................................ 25
Nehi Beverage Co. v. Hall, 174 S.W. (2nd) 509 ........................................... .12, 17
Nock v. Cooa-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super 515, 521, 156 Alt. 537 26
Parks v. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334; 144 P. 202 ............................................ 21, 24
Rachlin v. Tibby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 F. (2nd) 597 ............................ 20
Richenbachver v. California Pac~ing Corp., 250 Mass. 198, 145 N.E. 281 16
Rost v. Kee, 216 Ill. App. 497 ............................................................................ 15
Rozmailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145
Alt. 700 .................................................................................................... 13, 14, 2ey
Salmon v. Libby McNeill & Libby, 219 Ill. 421, 76 N.·E. 573 .................... 26
Searle v. Coca.:Cola ·Bottling Work of Lexington, 179 W. (2nd) 598 .... 12, 17
Stewart v. Kindel, 25 P. 990; 15 Colo. 539 ........................................................ 29
Toml,inson v. A1:mour & Co., 75 N.J. L. 748, 70 A. 314, 19 L.R.A.
N.S. 923 ................................................................................................................ 26
Thomas v. Winohester, 6 N.Y. 297, 57 Am. Dec. 455, 297 ............................ 11
Try-Me Beverage Co. v. Harris, 217 Ala. 302, 116 So. 147 ............................ 13
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N.E. 557 · .................................................... 21
Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 171 N.C. 33; 87 S.E. 958 ................ 21
Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152 .................... 15, 26
White v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 16 So. (2nd) 579 ........................................ 17
LAW REVIEW JOURNALS
23
52
42
46

·California Law Review, 621 ..........................................................................
Harvard Law Review, 328 ................................................................................
Harvard Law Rev·iew, 417 ................................................................................
Harvard Law Review, 162 ..................................................................................

26
26
26
26

(TEXT CITED)

Res Ipsa Loquitur by Mark Shain, 447 ................................................................
Uniform Laws Ann., Vol. 1, Pages 118, II9 ......................................................
Williston on Sales, Volume I, Page 489 ............................................................
I7 American Law Reports, 709 ............................................................................
105 American Law Reports, I5II ........................................................................
Ill Am-erican Law Reports, 1251 ........................................................................
I L. R. A. (N. S.) II78 .................................................................................... 15,

13
21
21
26
26
26
26

STATUTES

81-1-15 U. C. A. 1943 ................................................................................................ 20
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN H. JORDAN,
Plaitntiff and Respondent, ·

vs.

Case No. 7347

co·cA_JOOLA BOTTLIN G ooMP ANY O·F UTAH, ~a corporation,
Defendant arnd Appellant.
1

In this brief we shall ~refer ~to the p-arties .as they
appeared in ·the court ~hel'Ow. This statement of facts is
given for the purp·ose of S·up·plying the court with the
pertinent facts omitted in the defendant's hrief.
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The undisputed and uncontradicted evidtence reveals
that the plaintiff on or about the 5th day of October,
19·48, purchased a hottle of coca-·cola from a coca-cola
disp·ensing madhine owned !by the defendant which was
lo0ated just outside of the ~achine ·shop at the American
S·melting and Refining Company, at Garfield, Utah. This
machine had been leased to the American ·Smelting and
Refining 'Company, but was serviced daily, with the exception of week ends and holidays, hy defendant's employe·es.
Standing In the plaini tiff's immediate pres:ence
and by the ·coca-cola machine were two ·employees of the
American Smelting and ·Refining Company, whose nam·es
are Keith Wiseman and I.1eslie L. C'ramer. The plaintiff
placed a ni·ckel in the machine and was immediately
serve·d by the dispensing machine a bottle of coca-cola.
He stepped up to the machine's bottle cap· remover and
removed the cap and immediately dra:nk from the cocacola 'bottle. In the process of drinking .f:vom the ibottle
the plaintiff swallowed one fly and a large blow-fly
lodged in his mouth. 'rnhe eontents of tihe bottle were
foul, poisonous and contaminated. The plaintiff spit
out the blow-fly that had lodged in his mouth and put
it lhack in to the ibottle. About an hour later the plaintiff
he·came ·dleathly sick and nauseated. For three days
thereafter he suffered from nausea and dia.rrib.e.a.
Keith Wis.eman, a totally disinteor·ested, subpoened
witness, testi,fied that he saw the· plaintiff purchase the
bottle. He further testified he saw Mr. Jordan drink out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the bottle then spit the 'blo,v-fly out into his. gloveand put the fly back into the bottle of eoca-cola. He p·ositively identified the bottle of coca-cola introduced as
plaintiff's Exhibit ' 'A' '.
Leslie L. Cramer, who haa heen duly subpoenaed
and who had no interest whatsoever in the outcome of
the .suit, testified: That he was present when Mr. J·ordan
bought the !bottle of coca-cola. He saw the plaintiff take
.a ''swallow' ' of the eoke and then spit fue fly in to his
lhand, then replacing the fly in the bottle. Mr. Cramer
further testified that the three men had held the coke up,
to the light and it could he plainly s-een that there· was,
other foreign material present in the bottle of coca-cola.
{R-114).
George D. Walker, the co:ca--cola truck driver, te'Sti:fied that he serviced the dispensing machine fr.om which
the plaintiff p·urchased the bottle of poisonous eoca--col.a.
H·e further testified that he was and is employe-d iby the
Defendant Coca-Cola Company. He stated that the trneks\
are loaded at the Def·endant ';g. plant on 875 South W es.t
Temple and ·the bottled coca-cola is under his exclusive
eontrol until p.Iaced in the machine or the Forman's office. (R-105). On re-direct he testified he le.ft coke in
the .fore·man's. office nearly every week-end. {R-108).
But when questioned again three ·days later on the same
subject he testified as follows :
1;

Q. MT. Walker, have you left any coca-·cola in
the foreman's office since the

~summer

months'
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A.
TlME

1

I D,O,N'T RIDME:M:BE.R; IT'·.S BEEN A LONG
~GO. (R-183).

Mr. Walker further testified that ·he ·diid not know
of any other person s·ervicing the machine in question.
(R-179). When asked, "\Do you know of anylbody else
that has a right to go out and sell .c~Joca-·cola to the American !Sme.lting and Refining ·Company~ '' He replied,
''Not tihat I know of, no sir.'' He testified that he probably serviced the machine on ·O·ctoher 5, 19·48. (R-180).
L.ester Anderson, Head Guard and F·ire ~c·hief at
American Smelting and Refining ·Company, testified
that no one could get into the dispensing machine without a key. (R-t111). He further stated that there were
only two keys to the money lhox of the machine, the one
he had and the one held by Kelsey Rosandar. Thes·e keys
were originally p~resented rto him and M·r. Rosandar
by the defendant ~Company. (R-175). He further testified
that he had never known any .company other than the
defendant to serviee the ma.chines. (R-175-176). H·e
also testified that the defendani Company .b:vought this
dispensing machine from the 9th ,s.outh and West T·emp·le Plant. (R-177).
1

Peter H·anes, the maintenance man of the defendant Corporatinn, admitted under eross.-·examination, that
if the water pressure of the waslhing machine should
drop that the hottles would .not be p-rop·erly rinsed. (R134).
Mr. Hanes made the hold statement that the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant 's equipment was the '' 1\tlost up to date in the
industry". (R-129). Yet on cross examination, he made
the follo,ving answers to the foll·owing questions: (R-131)

Q. How ·do you know there are no better plants
• * *?
A.

I've been in a lot of plants.

Q. D·oes the company send you around to look at
these plants 1
A.

No, sir.

Q. How do you visit

them~

A. JUST V~SITIN\G ON MY VAC,ATIOiNS,
ANlD WHE·NEVER I HAP,PEIN TIO B:E O·UT ·O·F
T·O·WN.
Raymond Wilmert, the field engineer for the Radio
Corporation of America, testified that the electric eye
wlhich inspects the coca-cola hottle-s would ki·ck out any
bottle that had sediment, particles -of dust or any foreign suhstance,-EVEN A BUB.BL·E!
The defendants introduced exhibit "6 n which was
a lhottle containing a small No. 12 shot. Defendant's exhiJbit "5" was a bottle containing a piece of cork and
defendant ''s exhibit '4'' was a bottle ·Containing a bristle
from a brush. It was testified that all of these bottles
had heen rejected :by t~he ·electric eye. (NO EXHIBlT'S
WERE INTRJODUCE1D BY TH·E D·EFE·ND.ANT·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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C:OIC:A- ICOIL:A ,C;OMP ANY
FLIE.S.)

W·HlC'H

:C~ONTAINED

Donald A. ·Carmichael, the manager of tme defendant company, testi.fied that the defendant company had
an ·exclusiv·e franchise to sell bottled ·coca-cola in the
Salt _Lake territory. (R-184). This territory includes the
American ·,S,melting and Refining ~Company at Garfield,
Ut~h. (R-13). In answer to the following questions, Mr.
Carmiehael made the following ~replie-s :

Q. 1Do you let any of these other ·companies s·ell
·Coca..!cola in your territory'
A. We wouldn't p·ermit them to. We wouldn't give
them .a contract to ·do that* * *. (R-184).

Q. But you don't p·ermit the other bottling -companies to s-ell coca-cola to your customers in the .Salt
Lake Area, would JiOU'
A.

We wouldn't authorize them to do it.

IJ)r. Leo R. Curtis. admitte.d under cros~s-·examina
tion that he was a f.ormer employee of Salt Lake C~ty
of which 1\fr. ~Cihristensen, the def.endant 's attorney, is
·employed. ·T~he Salt Lake ~City insp·ector also testified in
the defendant's fawor.
All witnesses presented hy the defendant company
were ·employed ~dire·ctly or indirectly by the defendant

ex·cept Dr. Leo R.

~Curtis

and CM·r. Holding, who were
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employed or were formerly employed 'by tihe same corporation as was defendant's .attorney, E. Ray Christensent.

The plaintiff submits that the verdict of the ju·ry
and the judgment of the trial court should still ibe· affirmed. The trial eourt w.as correct in ·submitting the
cause to the jury on the theory of Res lpBa Loquitur.
Sho-uld this court be of the opinion that the trial ·court
di<1 err, the verdict and judgment should still he affirmed becaus·e had the trial court not ·erred in the rulings
and ·orders, set forth ~below, the verdict and judgment
would still remain the same. The plaintiff cross assigns the following errors made ;by the trial court:
(1) The trial court ·erred in refusing to give plaintiff's requested instruction No. III to the jury.
(2) Tlhe tri,al ·court erred in refu&ing to give
plaintiff's requested instruction No. IV to the jury.

(3) The trial court erred in refusing to giV·e plaintiff'·s reques·ted instruction No. V to the jury.
(4) The trial court erred, in refusing to plain tiff's
requested instruction No. VI to the jury.
(5) The eourt ·erred in not instructing the jury to
find in favor of the plaintiff on the theory of a breach
of implied warranty.
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AR·GUMENT
BOlNT I

'rHE EVIDE·N·CE IS OVERWHELMING THAT
THE DEFENDANT, C·OOA.JC:O~LA BOTTLING OOMPANY, B 0 TTLEJD THE PQISO~NOU·S BO·TTILE OF
CO!C·A-C~O~LA FRO·M
WHI~C:H THE PLAINTIFF
DRANK. In this regard the ·court's attention is respectfully called to plaintiff's EXHIBIT "A"~ the bottom
of which there is plainly printed '' Bettiw m~~Salt L.ake
City, Utah.'' It is undisputed that there is ibut one cocacola bottling company in ~S.alt Lake City, Utah, and that
company is the defendant.
1

1

It is further undisputed that the defendant company has the exclusive franchise to serve Salt Lake
City and vicinity, which includes the American Smelting
and Refining Company at Garfield, Utah.
It is undisputed that the defendant'.s truck driver,
George Walker, daily services the machine from which
the p·laintiff took the ·eontaminated bottle. It was,
p~roved ~beyond reasonable doubt iby testimony of Frank
Baer, the head of the accounting division of the American Smelting and Re:fining Plant at Garfield Utah that
the defendant company was the only ·Company which
had received paym·ent for ·coca-·col.a sold to the .American
Smelting and Re-fining Company and placed in the subJe·ct disp·ensing machine.
I

'

'
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It is further undisputed tha.t the vending machine
is o'vned and serviced by the defendant company. KelseY Rosandar and Lester Anderson further testified that
the only t\YO keys to the subject machine were issued to
them by the defendant company. 1\tlr. Carmichael positively testified that he would not p·ermit any ·other ·cocacola bottling company to service the territory orver which
the defendant ~company had! an e~clusive rranchise.
The court, in instructing the jury, required them to
:fip.d, before entering a verdict for the plaintiff, that the
defendant company bottled and produced the coca-·cola
put in evidence as plaintiff's EXHIBIT ''A''. It must
be .assumed that the jury was well satisfied from the evidence that the defendant company had bottled and produced the bottle of coca~cola introduced ·as plaintiff'.s
EXHIBIT "A". It is hard for the plaintiff to comprehend how, after the introduction of such overwhelming
·evidence and with the bottle its·elf having clear,ly p~rint
ed on the bottom, "lffit~in ·~Salt ·L~ake 'City, Utah",
that the defendant could .assert that the plaintiff had
failed to show ~that the ·coca-cola whiCJh poisoned the
plaintiff had ~been produced and bottle·d by the defendant
corporation.
ol

1

BOINT 2
THE PLAINTIF~F PRES·ENiTED MORE THAN
AMPLE EVID;ENC E 0'F DE.FENDAN'T 'S N.EGL~I
G~E:N·CID AND: WAS PRO·PERLY GRANTED AVERDICT BY ·THE, JURY.
1

Once again the d.e.fendant is .attempting to confuse
the issues of this case by lb.is ''Red Herring'' cry of no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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evidence. It shoul·d be kept in mind that the plaintiff's
right of ·recovery is fbased upon two theorie·s:
a. Res Ips~a I.Joquitur.
1h. Breach of implied warranty.
Under the two theories set-forth above the plaintiff
presented undisputed evidence iby wholely disinterested
witnesses that the bottle of coca-cola taken directly from
the ·coca-cola machine, owned and stocked daily by the
.
d·efendant company, was ·contaminated and polluted hy
hlow-flies and other poisonous substances.
It be-comes undeniable that at ·Some time or place
that ·some person had failed to exercise the p-roper care
to prevent hlow-flies and ·other noxious matter (see EXHIBIT ''A'') from the infestation of this bottle of cocacola.
The defendant attemp·ts to shy away from the responsibility of its I.aw imposed lialbility hy asserting that
the defendant :company lost control of this particular
bottle by p~lacing the same in its ma-chine which had
been leased to the American 1S-melting and Refining C:ompany.
To illustrate the possilhility of negligence of the defendant company, .as well as to ex·culp·ate the other, it
must be remembered that the ·evi{Lence fully discloses the
fact that all bottles of coca--cola taken to the American
Smelting and Refining were ·capped, bottled and sealed
at the def·endant's place of ~business. In such circumSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stances it must be concluded that the unfortunate incident was caus.ed by the lack of proper eare on the p·art
of the defendant company. Such conclusion is a natural one "\vhich is deductible from the facts of the case.
The defendant, in fue trial of the case and now in
his brief, is attempting to cloud the issues as set up· in
the plaintiff's complaint by trying to try this case on
the hasis of ordinary negligence. Save with one or two
exceptions the cases :cited in ·defendant's brief supports
the theory of ordinary negligence and theref.ore . are not
pertinent to the real issues of this case. In line with
defendant's tactics to avoid the real iss·ues the defendant attempts to avoid the doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to p·rove exclusive
control of the instrumentality causing the harm at the
time of injury. In supp·ort thereof the ·defendant has
cited those eases involving the furnishing and the serving of food not involving a sealed product, but ~has cited
those cases involving the furnishing and the serving of
food not in sealed containers. The only exception is a
f.ew ·cases .as handed down iby the courts. o£ North ·Carolina. Nearly all other states have adopted the rule :firmly established since the decision of Thomas vs. Winchester and 6 N.Y. 297-57 Am. Dec. 455, whieh held:
''That a manufacturer of .arti~cles. intended for human
consumption owes a duty of care to the ultimate ·consumer to s-ee that they are fit for such consumption. This
duty, as well as the ·duty ·of an inkeeper to ·exercise reasonable care in the preparation and inspection of food
being well established, the .doctrine of res ipsa l·oquitur
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would seem particularly .appropriate in cases resulting
from ·contaminated food, since there is usually exclu·sive control on the part of the manufaoturer'' * * ""
The slightest perusal of the cases reveals that the
overwhelming weight of authority ~has adopted the rule
which permits an inference of negligence where the article for ·consumption is in a sealed container.
In this case the bottle was capped and sealed,
therefore, the doctrine of res ip·sa loquitur was applicafble since the coca-cola company is deemed to have had
ex:clusive ·cont:r~ol. (C-oca-cola is a sealed product. S.ee
coca-cola bottling works of Evansville vs. Williams, 27
N.E. (2nd) 702. Nehl Beverage ·Co. vs. Hall, 174 S.W.
(2nd) 509. Searle vs. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of
Lexington, Ky., 179 S.W. (2nd) 598.) Under this theory, which was, applied without question by the trial
court, the acti~onaJhle negligence ·consists in the defendant placing on the market a bottle of poisonous coca-cola, and the question as to how the coca-cola became
poisoned is not p·art Df the plaintiff's case. See ·Cook vs.
People's Milk !Company, 152 N.Y.IS. 465.
1

The defendant ·Coca..J0 ola Company, in selling the
Coca--cola, 1bottJ.ed under seal, and ·delive-ring to its disp·ensing machines for distribution and sale (regardless
of whether the m·achine is leas-ed or owned outright iby
defendant) ass·umed the obligation to the public to provide a wholesome beverage ; .and under the rule of res
ipsa loquitur all the plaintiff need~ p·rove is that the
1
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plain tiff purchased a bottle of coca-cola, such a.s the defendant admitted placing in the dispensing machine at
the American Smelting and Refining, and that the cocacola contained substances that were poisonous, and in
drinking the coca-cola plaintiff became sick and poisoned.
These facts, "'"hi<ili were proved to the jury's satisfaction and beyond doubt, established the plaintiff's p~rima
facie case :against the .defendant. Whether t~he disp~ens
ing machine, from which the coca~cola was purcha8ed,
was leased or owned ,by the defendant, or whether the
defendant's manner of cleansing the coca-cola bottle is.
faulty, is not material to the plaintiff's cas-e. See Cook
vs. People's Milk Company, 152 N.Y.S. 465; Rozumailaski vs. Philadelphia Coca.JCola Bottling Company, 296
Pa. 114, 145 Alt. 700.
On the theory that care and preparation would havoe
prevented the injury and that the manufacturer has exclusive control in ''Try-me Beverage Company vs. Harris'', 217, Alabama 302, ·116, ~Southern 147, the court
clearly sets forth the general rule: '' 'Dhe P'res-ence of
foreign matter deleterious to health and s-~aled up in a
'bottle ~of soft drink IS EVID~ENOE OF NE\GLI-

GENOE.''
The text book wri~ters are in accord with the general rule that the theory of res ip~sa loquitur applies to
this type of case. Mark Shain in his recent hook on res
ipsa loquitur at page 447 states: "Courts: are quite uniform in permitting an inference of negligence where tihe
article f~or consumption is in a sealed container, on
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the theory that care in preparation or insp·ection would
have prevented the injury AND THAT THE MANUFACTURER HAD EXCLUSIVE CONTROL. (Emphasis ours).
The Maryland Courts in adopting the 81bove rule
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied in the
case of ·Goldman and F·reiman Bottling Co. vs. Sindell,
140 J\ifD. 488; 117 Atl. 866, saying: "FOR IT CERTAINLY'CANNOT BE ·SAID that the pres-ence of so
dangerous a rna terial as broken glass in a !bottle of
beverage represented as wholesome and safe, ·shown to
be in it when sold by the manufacturer IS NOT EVIDENCFJ OF NIDGLI~GENCE ON HIS PART."
In a case involving practically the same circumstances as the instant case, the Pennsylvania Court applied the e.s~tablished rule. The case is. titled Rozumarlski v. Philadelphia ·Coca.:Cola Bottling Company and is
found at 29,6 P.a. 114; 145 Atl. 700, here the court said:
''Where such sUibstances get into the product, whose
presence might possibly be due to that uncertain human
quality,-carelessness, somewhere along the line, the
manufacturer is responsible to a member of the Public
injured there~by. ''
Mississippi adop~ted and app~lied the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur and held the Coca-Cola Company liaible for damage in the case of Chapman vs. Jackson
Coca-Cola Company, 106 Miss, 864, 64 So. 791, when a
dead mous-e was found in a 'bottle of Coca-Cola the
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Court said: '' ,,-rhen a. manufacturer 1nakes, bottles and
sells to retail trade, to be .again sold to the general public, a beverage represented to 1be refreshing and harmiess, he is under a legal duty to see to it that in the process of ·bottling no foreign substance shall be mixed with
the beverage, which, if taken into the human stomach,
will be injurious.'' Citing Watson v. Augusta Brewing
Co., 124 Ga. 121, 52 S.E. 152, 1 L.R.A. (NS) 1178.
The lllinois ·Court applied the rule of res ipsa loquitur to .a case presenting almost identical facts as
the one at bar in the ·case of Rost vs. Kee, 216 Ill., App.
497.
In Cook vs. Peoples Milk Co., 15·2 NYS 465, the
New York ·Courts held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applies to sealed product~ and the manufacturer is liable
for injuries caused hy their sealed products, the Court
in ap~plying the general rule held: ''The actionable negligence, which is denied ;by the defendant -consists, if at
all, in placing upon the market poiS:onous milk, and the
question as to how the milk became poisoned is no part
of the plaintiff's case. The defendant, in selling its·
milk tbottled under seal, and delivered to merchants for
distribution and sale, .assumed the obligation to the public to provide wholesome milk; .and if the plaintiff can
establish the fact it purchased a quart of milk, such as
the defendant· admits having ~delivered to Mr. Emens
(the grocery man) and tha.t such milk contained active
dangerous poison, and that in using such milk she was
made siek, sore, etc., SHE HAS ESTABLISHED A
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P;RIM·A FACIE ·CASE AGAINST D:~EFE·NDANT,
AND THE P·ART~CULAR ST·O·RE· IN W·HIC·H DEFENDANT PU·RC~HASED IT,S B·OTTLES, O·R MANNIDR O!F rC·LEANSIN~G THE S.AJME, IS NOT M~
TERIA~L TO PLAIN·TIF·F 'S C·ASE. ''
The ·court continued on page 468 after placing its
stamp of approval on Thomas V. Winchester, supra,
which originally s-et down the foregoing rule of law, said:
''The principle of the above case (as set forth in the
3Jbove paragraph) has been -consistently followed hoth
in this state and the ·Sup·reme Court of the Unit·ed Stat·es.
(Citing numerous cases.)
In Ricili.enibachver v. ·California Packing Corp., 250
Mass. 19·8, 203, 13·5, N. E. 281, 282 (19r24), the doctrine
~of -res ip~s:a loquitur. was applied to canned good as well
as sealed bottles. In a case involving a piece of glass
found in a ean of spinach, the Mas.sachus~etts court said:
"'Tihe fact that the glass got into the -can during the
p·rep·aration of the spinach and before the can wa:s
sealed, was a -circumstance which warranted an inference that some p·erson whose duty it was to s·ee that the
SYJs.tem was observoed was negligent. in the examination
of the contents of the ·can hefore it was s-ealed, if not
negligent in preventing the presence of glass at a place
where it ·could be put or might fall into the can.''
In Dryden v. ~Continental B-aking C·o., 77 P (2nd) 835,
that ·C-alifornia, in app·lying the rule of res ip1sa loquitur
said: "J}t go-es without saying that any manufacturer
intending his product for human -consumption should
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exercise a high degree of care to see that his products
do not contain any foreign substance whidh, if swall~owed,
might cause bodily injury or death to the consumer* * ~.
In view ·of the aboYe it seems only fair to presume that
the presence of deleterious substances in a package of
food occurs through some negligent act of omission or
commission on the part of the agents of the manufacturer, citing Linker vs. Quaker Oats, 1 Fed. Supp. 79·4, and
Rozumailaski v. Philadelphia ~Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
296 Pa. 114, 1145 A 700.''
The Court is urged to read the following cases which
deal with facts and circumstances similar with t'his case:
E·ach ca-se cited upholds the trial. ·court and th·e plaintiff
by sustaining the application of the doctrine of res ip1sa
loquitur in this type of case:
C·oca Oola Bottling works of Evansville, Inc., v.
Williams (1941) 37 N.E. (2nd) 703; N·ehi Beverage Co.
v. Hall (1943) 174 S.W. (2nd) 509; Seale v. C·oea-Cola
Bottling Works of Lexington, Ky., 179 S.W. (2nd) 59'8;
Kelly v. ~Ouachita Dairy, 175 So. 199; Auzenne vs. Gulf
Public Serviee Co., 181 S.·O. 54; Hollis v. Ouachita Coca'0ola Bottling Co., 196 S·o. 376; White v. Coea-~Cola
Bottling, 16 S~o. ('2nd) 579· (1944).
Should the court accept the defendant's t~heory and
require positive evidence that the ·defendant was negligent in prep~aring this particular sealed p·roduct, such a
rule would completely deprive this plaintiff of a reme~dy
in ·Court. It must ~he conceded that the furnishing of
such proof is impossible. It was situations such as this
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that resulted in the birth ·of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. T1he eourts 1have long recogniz·ed that the remedies of injured consumers ought not ;be denied because
·of the intricacies of the law. Every ·eonsideration of
law and pUJblic policy require that the consumer should
have a remedy. See Davis vs. Van ·Camp· P:acking Co.,
189 Iowa 775; 176 N.W. 382. This being a sealed product the plaintiff respe~ctfully submits that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applies on the theory that care in
preparation or insp·eetion would have prevented the
injury and that the manufacturer had exclusive control.
(North Carolina, being the only authority to the contrary.) This doctrine having been properly .applied by
the trial eourt and tll.e jury having decided that the defendant was negligent in accordance with instruction
No. 6 (R-188); and the defendant having failed to prove
he was not negligent in accordance with instruction No.
7 (RJ189) the jury's ·decision should stand. It is obvious
that the jury was not impressed by evidence such as was
introduced by Mr. Hanes, that defendant's plant was
most up-to-date and he knew for he visited .other plants
"ON MY VAC.ATiONS, AND WHENEVER I HAPPEN TO BE OU·T OF T·OWN. ''
Mr. Wilmert':s testimony that the ·electric eye would
ki~k out a 'bottle if it had a bubble in it was evidently
more than the jury could "swallow". IDsp·ecially. when
he testified the ~bottles are .spun 1500 R. P.M., then
stopped; then s~un 3000 R.P.M., then stopped; then spun
3000 R.P.M., then stopped, ·.and on the second stop carried pa&.s the electric eye. (R-140).
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It was evident that the jury was not too imp·re·ssed
with the testimony of Louis R. ·Curtis, a former fellow
employee ·of Mr. Ohristen:s·en, the d·efendant 's -attorney,
who was ·effectively led by Mr. ·Christensen throughout
his testimony which was obviously colored by prejudice.
He admitted that he was ap·pearing as a paid p·rofessional witness for the defendant coca-cola eomp~any. The
testimony of Mr. Holding was likewise colored; with
prejudice and probably had little effect on the jury.
Under the law and facts as presented aforesaid the
plaintiff resp·ectfully submits that the District Court
and Jury correctly found that there was a causal chain
stretching between the act or omission on the p·art of
the defendant and the injury to the plaintiff and that tihe
defendant failed to prove he was not negligent. The
jury's vel'ldict should ;be affirmed.
POINT 3
THE PLAINTIFF PRE:SENTIDD MOIRE THAN
.A!MPLE EVIDENCE WOR REC~OVERY UNDER THE
B'REAOH OF WARRANTY THEORY.
It is noted that the Plaintiff has cross as.signed as
error the trial Court '·s refusal to give Plaintiff's instructions No. III, No. IV, No. V, N·o. VI. These instructions were submitted to the court in accordance with
the Plaintiff's s·econd and alternativ·e theory set forth
in ~the Complaint-B~RIDACH ~OF IMPLIEiD WARRAN·TY.
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In this regar-d the Court'.s attention is respectfully
called to ~Sec. 81-1-15 U.:C.A. 19·43, ·sub-paragraph 2,
whie;h supplies· the basic law for this contractual theory.
Tib.is ~se·ction p·rovides that such a warr.anty exists:
''I. Where a buyer, expressly or iby impJication,
makes known to the .seller the p·articular purpose for
which goods are required, and it ap·pears that the buyer
relie~s on the seller's skill or judgment there is an implied warranty ~that the goods shall he reasonably fit
for suClh purpose.''
A great number of the .states that have adopted
the Uniform Sales Act, of which ·Sec. 81-1-15, sub-paragraph 1, U.C.A., 1943, is a part, have permitted recovery under the theory of impJied warranty in this type
of a case where food is ~served in a sealed container.
This theory is urged upon the ~court. It is conceded that
this eourt has never pass·ed directly upon this point.
The trial ·court refused to instruct on the above
theory beeau.se he said there was no privity of contract
existing 'between the plaintiff and derf·endant. In this regard, it is urged that none need exist ihHcause the beverage purchased was in :a sealed -container.
In Rachlin ·vs. Tibby-Owens-Ford Glas·s ·Company, 96 F (2nd) ·597 t·o 600, the court eommented upon
the fact that although the orthodox rule requires privity
of ~contra·ct between the p~arties in an action for breach
of warranty, '' S·everal ·C:ourts :have re-cognized an exception to the gener.al .doctrine in the case of medicines
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and food stuffs., a.nd have held a manufacturer to warrant tQ the ultimate consumer that the article i:s fit for
human consumption.''

In Volume 1, Uniform Laws Ann. pages 118, 119,
there is written, ''It has, however been declared that
foodstuffs do not fall within the rule of want of p·rivity
between the manufacurer and ultimate consumer, with
retailer intermediate.'' Also ·see Hertzler vs.. ManS/hum
(1924) 228 ·Mich. 4[6, 200 N.W. 155; War:d B.aking Company vs. ·Trizzino (lg.28), 161 N.E. 5·57.
Likewis·e, in Willision on Sales, Volume 1, Page
489, the author stated that in the more modern and up
to date cases the courts have imp·osed aJbs,olute liability
of a warrantor on the manufacturer in favor of th·e ultimate purchaser. (Citing, among other authorities, D:oihan Chero-Cola Bottling 'Company vs. Weeks., 16 Ala.'·
app. 639, 80 ·So. 734; Davis vs. Van Camp Packing Company, 189 Iowa 77·5, 17~6 N.W. 382, 17 A.'L.'R. 649·, Barks
VS'. Yost Pie ·C:ompany, 93 Kan. 334 144 P. 202 L~RA
1915 ·C 179; W.ard vs. Morehead City S·eafood Comp·any,
171 N·C 33, 87 ·S.E. 958; 'Catani vs.. Swift & Company,
251 Pa., 5~2, 95A93ll, RA 1917 B 1272; Maz,etti vs. Armour Oomp·any, 75 Wash. 6·22, 135 p 6·33, 48 LRA, N~S
213; Fle·ssher v.s. C'Orstens Packing Company, 93 Wash.
48, 160 P. 14.
In the ·Case of W:ard Baking 'C·omp·any vs. Trizzino,
27 Ohio App·. 475, 161 N.E.. 557, the court in dealing
with this p·robJ,em, held: "The groceryman, who is in; efSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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feet merely a distributing medium for the articles of food
furnished by ·the Baking Company, ·having full knowledge of the fact dealt with each other and entered into
a ~contractual relationship for the benefit of the plliblic
which is the Ultimate ·Consumer. In other words, this
·contract 1between the groceryman and the W!ard Baking
·Company, to all intents and purposes was a contract entered into for the benefit of a third party, to wit, the
Ultimate ·C·onsumer. '' The Court continued: ''Consideration of ~public policy ·demand that the utmost ·care and
·caution be extracted from the manufacturer of articles
of food, who not only manufactures the same, hut causes
the ·same to be delivered to grocerymen for the purpose of
general distribution to ~the general public. THE 0 0N·SUMER HAS A RIGHT TO RE~LY ·ON THE IMPLIED RE·PRE·SENTATIIO·N IOF THE BAKING COMPANY THAT THE.SE ARTLC!LE:S BElARING ITS
N.&ME ARE. NOT ONLY FREE FRO:M INJ·URI~OUS
SUBS·TANC·ES, B:UT ARE FIT F;O·R CON·SUMPTlON AS F~O~O·D. (Emphasis ours).
1

And in the ·case entitled Anderson vs. Tyler, Iowa,
274 N.W. 48, 50, it was held that the duty of a manuf-actt,~ ·r is "to .see to it that food p.roducts put out hy him
are, wholes·ome ''; that the implied warr.anty that such
products were fit for use ·:r.an with the sale, and to the
public, for t~he bene.fit of the consumer, rather than to
the. wholesaler or retailer; and that privity of contract
was not controlling.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
In Pow D·rug Co. vs. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13
N.E. (2d) 130, 13-5, it was said: "That there is a liability upon a negligent manufacturer \Yho sells articles
kn·owing they are intended for resale to s~uhpurchas·ers
is clear from the trend of modern aut·horities. T:he only
controversy is as to the 'basis of the liability, some
holding ·that the implied warranties are made for the
benefit of the subpurchasers and form the basis of lia~
bility. (Citing cases.)"
Likewis·e, in the case entitled Hertzler vs. Manshum,
2·28 Mich. 416, 200 S.W. 155, 156, which wa.s an action
against both the miller and a retailer of flour, for .death
caused by the presence of arsenate of lead in the said
flour, which had heen use·d in the preparation of food
eaten (by the deceased, the court said: ";D·efendant Hanehett contends f.or no liability under th·e general r11le
t:hat the manufacturer of an article or commodity sold
a retail dealer is not liahle to a subs~equent prurchas·er
upon an implied warranty for injuries due to defects 1or
impurities therein. This general rule is based on w.ant
of contractual relation. BUT FOODSTU·FFS DO NOT
F .A·LL WITHIN THE RULE O~F WANT OF PRIVITY BETWEEN THE M·AN,UF AC·TURER AND ULT'IMATE OON.S~UMER, with a retail deal-er intermedia.f~j;.
* * * The implied warranty, .so called, reae;hing from
the manufacturer of foodstuffs to the ultimate puroh1tser for immediate consumption is in the nature of a representation that the highest degree of care has (been exerci·sed, * * *. We are fully persuaded that the manufacturer of foodstuffs is liable to respond in damages to
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the purchaser ther·e-of, for immediate consumption, injured by a .foreign poisonous substance therein; that the
retail .dealer may be joined as a party defendant; and
the liability -of ~both may ·he counted on in tort for negligence OR BREAC'H ·OF IMPLIED WARRANTY AS
MENTIONE~D.'' (Emphasis ours).
And in Davis vs. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa
775, 176 N.W. 382, 389, 17 A.L.R. 649, it was held that
one seeking ·damages. from a food manufacturer for injuries ·Caused hy eating unwholesome food was not compelled to el·ect between implied warranty and negligence
as a ground for recovery. In that case also it was contended hy the defendant packing company that there
could ibe no w:arr:anty, express or implied, because ther·e
was no privity ·of contract ·between the defendant and
plaintiff. There the ·court said : ''The remedies of inJured consumers ought not be made to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sale~. The obligation of the
manufacturer should not he based alone upon privity of
contract. * * * every consideration of law and public
p·olicy require that the consumer should have a remedy,"
* * * In the case of Parks vs. iC. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan.
334, 1144 P. 202, L.R.A. 1910, 179·, 181, * * * The court
·says: ''..A manufacturer or dealer who puts human
food up·on the market for sale or for immediate consumption ·does so upon an imp1ied representation that it
is whole.some for human consumption'' * * * In Boyd vs.
Coca-~Oola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177 ·S.W. 80,
tih-e ·Court said: '' * * * ~Some of the cas-es pla;ce the Iia·
~hility on the grounds. heretofore stat·ed; others say there
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is an implied warranty 'Yhen goods are dlispensed in
original packages, w··hich is available to all damaged by
their use; and another case says that the liability rests
upon the .demand of .social justice.'' * * * We are of
opinion that the duty of a Illanufacturer to see to it that
food products put out by him are wholesome, an·d the
implied warranty that such products are fit for us~e runs
with the sale, and to the public, for the benefit of the
consumer, rather than to the wholesaler or retailer, and
that THE Q~UE·STION OF PRIVITY O·F CONTR~q·T·
IN SALE!S IS NO·T ~OONTROLLING, and does not
apply in such a case.'' (Emphasis ours).
Also, the case entitleCL Mazetti v.s. Armour & Co., 75
Wasih. 622, 135 P. 6-33, 48 L.R.A., N.S., 213, Ann. Cas.
1915·0, 140. In ·discussing the question of liwbility of the
meat p·acker the court said: ''Although the cases differ
in their reasoning, all agre·e that there is a liability in
such cases irrespective of any privity of contract in the
sense of immediate contraot between the parties. * * *
Our holding is that, in the absence of an express w·arranty of quality, a manufacturer of food products under rnodern conditions impliedly W'arrants his goods
when dispensed in original packages, and that such warranty is available to all who may be damaged by reason
of their use in the legitimate chwnnels of trade.
The f.ollowing are among the more reeent cases holding that the ultimate consumer may hring 'his action direct against the manufacturer: Meshhesher v. C1hannellene ·Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 ·Minn. 104, 11~ N.W. 428, 131
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Am. St. Rep. 441; Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J. L.
748, 70 A. 314, 19· L.R.A., N.S., 923; ·Salmon v. Libby,
MeN eill & Libby, 219 Ill. 42,1, 76 N.E. 573; Haley v. Swift
& Co. (152 Wis. 570), 140 N.W. 2·92; Watson v. Augusta
Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121, 6·2 S.E. 152, 1 L.R.A., N.S.
1178, 110 Am. St. Rep. 157; Ketterer v. Amnour & Co.,
D. '0., 200 F. 322. * * *
1

And in the ease entitled Manaker v. SuppleeWill.s.-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa., 76, 189 A. 714, 715, it
was held that: ''A manufacturer who puts upon the
market £ood intended for human consumption in a
sealed bottle or original package is held to rep·resent to
each purchaser, even though the purchas:e is made
·through a third dealer, that the .contents thereof are
wholesome and suitable for the purpose for which they
are sold. Noek v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, !102 Pa.
Super. 515, 521, 156 Alt. 5;37; Rozumailski v. Philadelphia ·Coea-'Cola Bottling ·Co., 296 P~a~ 1114, 145, Alt. 700;
1Cantani v. Swift & tOo., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Alt. 9~31, L.R.A.
1917B, 1272. ''
T:he question here under ~consideration also has
been the subject of review in the various. law journals.
Flor eomments, s.ee: 42 Harvard Law Review, 417; 46
Harvard Law Review 162; 5'2 Harvard Law Review 328;
23 California Law Review 621. See generally: 17 A.L.R.
709 105 A.L.R. 1511 ; 111 A.L.R. 1251.
It will fbe seen from .a r·eading of the foregoing auth:orities that the· modern trend p~ermits. a consumer to
recover, for injuries re.ceived in ·Consuming poisonous
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foodstuffs from a sealed container, from the manufacturer.
It is apparent that a bottle of coca-cola which is
full of flies and other foreign substances (see p·laintiff's
exhibit "A") is not fit for human consumption. Th.at
the plaintiff became deathly sick_ from consuming the
poisonous coca-cola is disclosed 'by the ·evidence. Certainly thi·s evidence and the abundance of adjudicated cases
directly in point herein certainly sup·ply an abundance
of authorities for the affirmation of the judgment giv-en
by the District Court herein.
In ·conclusion the court's attention is called to the
case of Klein vs. Duchess Sandwich Co., 9·3 P (2nd) 799,
a 1939 case in which the Cali£ornia Supreme Court after
a careful analysis of the ca.Hes held:
"In adop·ting the statute here concerned as
a part of the Uniform Sales act, it was the cleat
intent of the legislature that, with r·esp·ect to
foodstuffs, the implied warranty provision therein contained should inure t~o the benefit of any ultimate p·urohaser or consumer of food; and that
it was not intended that a striet "privity of contra·ct" would be ·essential for the bringing of an
acti·on by ~such ultimate consumer for an asserted
!breach of the implied warranty.''
It is su!bmitte·d that the plaintiff's theory of breach
of implied warranty i·s amply supiporte·d iby authorities
and is based up·on sound p·rinciple. The trial court
should have instructed the jury in accordanee "ith
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plaintiff's instructions 3, 4, 5 and 6. Had the trial court
1done so-the result would have remained the same,
therefore it ~s contended that the jury's verdi·ct sihould
!be affirmed on hoth theories set forth in plaintiff's oomplaint.
POINT 4
THE 8'00PE 0 F CR0 SS EXAMINATlON IIS
NOT LIMITED WHEN J)IREC:TED AT THE CREDIBILITY, BIAS OR INTE·RES:T OF A W:ITNEBS.
1

1

1

It is indeed gratifying to the p~lain tiff to find that
the def·endant Coca-.Cola Company, after a two-day trial
resulting in a 110 page transcript of evidence was so
lacking in grounds for appeal that they have devoted 8
p~ages of the preeious space in their brief to complain of
~wo questions asked by plaintiff's eoun6el on cros:S-examination. (The defendant sets forth three questions-but
as revealed by t_?e reeord at page 144 the defendant did
n~ot obj·eet to p·laintiff's question asked Raymond Wilmert.
Not having 0 bjeeted, the defendant is certainly not now
entitled to eomplain.)
1

Every witness produced by the defendant was admittedly bias and prejudiced. C:ertainly the plaintiff
wajs entitled to question the witnesses -concerning their
in tere.st and bia~s in this suit. If Mr. Hanes. is a paid
professional witness who ·earns his livelihood by testifying for the defendant -company, the jury was entitled to
know this fact .and to consider this bias in weighing his
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sonal friend ·of Mr. Moreton and te:Stifies 'daily for him
the jury was also entitled to know and weigh his te~sti
mony accordingly.
Our Utah courts have alwaJls permitted any question to he ·asked ·on ·cross examination which tends to
test veracity or credibility and this court has directed
that the courts s·hould he especially liberal WJhere such
queS'tion is aimed to show )bias or prejuCLiee. See Holt v.
Nelson, 109 Pac. 470, 37 Utah 5·66; Fissure Min. Co. v.
Ole Susan Min. ~co., 220438, 63 P. 587. The que;g~tions
complained of:
(I noti·ce that your .attorney is che-cking your
questions. quite carefully with the transcript.
Rave y;ou te.stified a good deal in thes·e cases~)
(Y,ou have been subpoenaed before t·o testify
in these ·case·s for Mr. Moreton, ihaven 't you?)
(R. 159).
were aske-d for the purp·ose of showing that defendant ':s
witnes.se.s were bias and p·rejudice.d. It is submitted that
they were a p~roper p~art of cross examination. Possible
inference.s and tender feelings have ne·ver abrogated the
long esta!hlished rul·e permitting inquiries of t~hi:s type
and nature. S·ee :Stewart v. Kindel, 25 P. 990; 15 Colo.
539; McCowan v. Northeast Si~herian Co., 84 P. 6:14; 41
Wash. 67'5.
It should he noted that in hoth of the instances
complained of ·hy the defendant the court ordered the
question stricken and instructed the jury to disregard
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it. If the question was in error, which the plaintiff denies, the error was -certainly wiped out by the court's
ruling and ins,truction.
It is submitted that the verdict rendered by the jury
in District Court should he affirmed.
Res.p·ectfully s111bmitted,
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